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Abstract: Public service broadcasters (PSBs) are a central part of national news media 
landscapes. In many countries, PSBs are the first choice of citizens when it comes to news 
providers. And in perhaps more countries still, PSBs are thought of as specialists in 
provision of hard news. We test this proposition here using survey data from a large cross-
national survey involving indicators of current aﬀairs knowledge and media consumption. 
Specifically, we examine whether exposure to public versus commercial news influences the 
knowledge citizens possess about current aﬀairs, both domestically and internationally. We 
also test, using propensity score analysis, whether there is variation across PSBs in this 
regard. Results indicate that compared to commercial news, watching PSB has a net 
positive influence on knowledge of hard news, though not all PSBs are equally eﬀective in 
contributing to knowledge acquisition. This knowledge gap between PSB and commercial 
news media consumption appears to be mitigated by factors such as de jure independence, 
proportion of public financing, and audience share. 
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The availability of news about current aﬀairs, both domestic and international, is essential 
for fostering an informed and engaged citizenry. People rely on news about the world around 
them in order to participate in democratic governance, but also to make basic choices about 
how to live from one day to the next. Economic news can help us decide whether to save or 
spend; consumer news helps determine the scale of our purchases; environmental news can 
change not just our consumer behaviour but what we do at home as well.1 In short, news 
matters. 
The belief that easy access to news strengthens the democratic process has been a central 
justification for public service broadcasting (PSB). The argument is as follows. Commercial 
media need audiences and advertisers to survive; market incentives lead to the 
overproduction of content that is popular, and a lack of supply of the kind of information 
that meets the requirements above. Commercial broadcasters may be beholden to 
advertisers, and/or may show partisan biases. PSBs, funded largely if not entirely through 
public funds, are not vulnerable to market forces, and are required to be impartial and fair 
on political matters. (Though there is some variance here, which we discuss below.) In short, 
PSBs are intended to help citizens get more of the information they need, particularly 
information that commercial media cannot or will not provide.
Whether PSBs regularly achieve this objective is not clear. There are real diﬀerences in the 
funding, independence, and audience share of PSBs across countries to be sure.2  And the 
funding crises that many PSBs have experienced in recent years suggest that politicians and 
publics are somewhat skeptical about the role these broadcasters can (and should) play in 
the future.3  Public broadcasters have also been subject to a range of negative stereotypes 
related to ineﬃciency, aloofness, and pretention. In the UK, the latter two sentiments are 
perhaps best captured by the tongue-in-cheek “Auntie” nickname, sometimes applied to the 
BBC.  Indeed, the well know mantra of PSBs, to inform, educate and entertain, also comes 
across as somewhat antiquated in a modern digital media environment in which the ability 
to satisfy our information needs seems nearly limitless. 
It is clear that the number of news sources competing for the consumer’s attention has 
increased dramatically. Today, the typical citizen in the developed world decides not just 
which medium(s) to use for news, but also decides between many diﬀerent newsrooms 
oﬀering coverage of daily events. There are so many sources that we cannot possibly attend 
to all of them; moreover, citizens are heavily constrained in the amount of time they can or 
want to spend acquiring current aﬀairs information in the first place.4 Few citizens, then, get 
news from even a wide range of the available sources. Contemporary patterns of news 
consumption are thus highly specialised and increasingly non-random. 
It is in this context that the current paper explores the impact of public versus commercial 
television news exposure on citizens’ knowledge of current aﬀairs. More specifically, we 
investigate the proposition that public service broadcasters produce higher levels of 
knowledge about domestic and international aﬀairs than do commercial broadcasters. We 
test this proposition across six countries with varying media landscapes, and in so doing are 
able to also examine the possibility of cross-national variance in the impact of PSB versus 
commercial broadcasters — heterogeneity based on factors related to the national media 
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systems, including the proportion of public financing, daily audience share, and 
independence of PSBs. In short, we seek to determine whether exposure to diﬀerent models 
of news provision – market-driven versus public service-oriented – influences the stock of 
knowledge people have about current aﬀairs. Are PSBs more eﬃcient than commercial 
newsrooms at informing citizens? Are all PSBs equally eﬀective? Answers to these questions 
matter not just for how we understand television news, but also speak to the future 
provision of public- versus commercial-funded news (on television and otherwise) more 
generally.
Testing the impact of public versus commercial broadcasters on current aﬀairs knowledge is 
the substantive focus of the paper that follows, but we seek to make a methodological 
contribution as well. The media eﬀects literature at which this article is aimed has waged a 
longstanding battle with the issue of selection eﬀects — an issue which almost certainly 
worsens as the media environment diversifies and fragments.5  Particularly where cross-
sectional survey research is involved, it is widely acknowledged that attempts to link media 
exposure with outcome variables such as beliefs, opinions, or any form of behaviour are 
vulnerable to reverse causality counterfactuals. In other words, it is diﬃcult to figure out if 
media exposure drives knowledge (X→Y) when it is also possible that knowledge leads to 
media exposure (X←Y). 
Recent work has demonstrated that, particularly in the current media environment, the two 
eﬀects are occurring simultaneously. People do learn from media, but knowledge and 
interest also determine which media people are exposed to.6  We cannot completely resolve 
this issue, of course — at least not without long-term panel data.  But we do discuss below 
(and further in the online appendix) the possibility that the technique of propensity score 
matching provides an appropriate strategy for producing somewhat more conservative 
estimates of media eﬀects; that is, estimates of media eﬀects that are somewhat less aﬀected 
by endogeneity. 
Results suggest that watching PSB news programs is related to higher levels of “hard” news 
knowledge than is watching commercial broadcasts for the same amount of time. In other 
words, controlling for the diﬀerences in the audiences for public versus commercial 
newscasts, it appears that people tend learn more about domestic and international aﬀairs 
from following PSB news for a few hours a week than they do from following commercial 
media. Where “soft” news is concerned – knowledge of current sporting and entertainment 
headlines, for instance – there is no clear advantage to getting news from public or private 
media sources. Thus, results do not support the contention that while PSBs focus on hard 
news, commercial broadcasters are the specialists for knowledge on soft news.
This is the general tendency across countries, at least. For certain countries in our sample, 
however, the knowledge gap between PSB and commercial media is entirely absent. In 
general, knowledge gaps between PSBs and commercial broadcasters are widest in countries 
where public broadcasters attract significant daily viewership, where the share of PSB 
revenue derived from public monies is high, and where institutional rules of independence 
from national governments are strongest. 
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The first section of this article reviews the literature on the relationship between PSBs and 
citizen knowledge. Subsequent sections introduce our cross-national survey data, discuss the 
potential advantages of a propensity score analysis approach to studying media eﬀects, and 
then implement that analysis. The results suggest diﬀerences across countries, and so we 
undertake a final analysis to make sense of these diﬀerences using cross-national media 
system variables. These results are discussed as they relate both to the justification for PSB, 
and to our understanding about the eﬀects of media consumption more generally.
 Public and Commercial Broadcasters Compared
The possibility of knowledge gaps resulting from exposure to primarily commercial or public 
newscasts presupposes that the newscasts are in fact markedly diﬀerent. Where PSB news 
varies significantly from commercial news, the potential for knowledge eﬀects is strong, all 
else being equal. If PSB and commercial news programs are quite similar, however, 
diﬀerential eﬀects on knowledge are less plausible.7  When content is similar, evidence for 
more (or less) informed PSB audiences is quite likely an artefact of the audience being more 
(or less) informed to begin with. That said, the probability of selection eﬀects should 
increase where public and commercial newscasts are substantively diﬀerent — real (or 
perceived) diﬀerences between news providers is precisely what should lead well-informed 
citizens to consistently select into particular streams of news.  In short, teasing out the 
impact of PSBs versus private broadcasters, controlling for selection eﬀects, is diﬃcult.
Several recent studies involving PSB and commercial media content have focused on 
coverage patterns related to the supply of current aﬀairs information.8 Generally, results are 
consistent with respect to the issue of hard versus soft news content: PSBs tend to report 
more hard news on average than the commercial newscasts in their markets.9   Numerous 
case studies highlighted the well-known mantra of “informing, enlightening, and 
entertaining” that is widely associated with the institution of public broadcasting;10  and 
entertainment is typically cast third of the three objectives. What this means is that on a 
regular news day people are likely to encounter a greater proportion of foreign news, 
domestic and international politics, and pubic policy-oriented reports if they tune into a 
PSB newscast rather than a commercial newscast. Conversely, watching commercial 
newscasts increases the likelihood of exposure to what is typically regarded as soft news – 
e.g. crime, human-interest, celebrity, or entertainment-oriented stories.
In fact, research in this vein has pointed to heterogeneity not just across newscasts in terms 
of soft versus hard news, but also with respect to the placement and volume of current 
aﬀairs programming airing on a typical day.11 Practically speaking, the literature 
suggests that during prime time, when television audiences spike, citizens residing in the 
most commercialised media systems are least likely to encounter (hard) news programming 
on any free-to-air TV channel. Countries where public broadcasting plays a leading role in 
the media system are where (hard) news programming tends to flourish during prime time. 
In short, the aggregate provision of news versus entertainment programming varies 
according to the media system. 
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None of this necessarily means that living in highly commercial media contexts leaves 
citizens with less news to select from and promotes lower levels of news consumption, of 
course. It is entirely possible that other media – online, radio, or print – compensate for 
relatively low levels of prime time TV news in commercial media systems. Online media 
content is not restricted geographically, and thus there is little to prevent citizens in more 
commercialised systems to look elsewhere for news if they chose to do so.  
The important point is this: the more commercialised the media system is, the more 
proactive citizens may need to be about seeking out meaningful news on a day-to-day basis. 
Inadvertent or incidental exposure to the news during prime time news programs occurs 
more frequently in countries where public broadcasting is a strong component of the 
national media system.12 And where PSB and commercial newscasts are concerned, there is 
evidence that hard news tends to receive shorter shrift on commercial compared to public 
TV. In a nutshell, there is evidence that the quantity and quality of news varies 
systematically across public and private broadcasters.  The potential exists, then, for a link 
between PSB and knowledge (driven by some combination of exposure and selection bias). 
Current Aﬀairs Knowledge and News Exposure
Much of the extant literature about news exposure and knowledge acquisition has 
questioned whether diﬀerent media produce diﬀerent eﬀects. Until recently newspapers and 
television tended to dominate the debate, though a growing body of work now focuses on 
online news consumption. While many have found positive eﬀects of newspaper consumption 
on knowledge and particularly factual information gain,13  others have pointed to 
comprehension benefits and longer term memory retention resulting from TV news 
exposure,14  and others still have cast a positive light on online media where integrated 
knowledge gain, political interest and participation is concerned.15  So clearly all media 
matter in one way or another. That said, most studies suggest that one’s preferred news 
media form, or modality, is significantly related to their performance on a battery of current 
aﬀairs questions.16
As noted above, previous research suggests that PSB news programming varies significantly 
from commercial TV newscasts. At the very least, PSBs cultivate a reputation (deservedly 
or not) for reporting current aﬀairs in distinct ways from their commercial rivals. Thus, 
compared to people who regularly watch commercial news programming, it seems reasonable 
to expect that those who routinely consume PSB newscasts have higher levels of hard news 
knowledge; conversely, PSB viewers may be less knowledgeable about soft news. 
Few studies have empirically addressed this possibility of knowledge gaps resulting from 
exposure to public and commercial TV, and within this small literature results are rather 
mixed. Consider some recent results from two panel studies. Using Norwegian election study 
participants, Jenssen finds no evidence that exposure to NRK news – from Norway’s main 
(public) broadcaster – was more informative than following commercial news.17  Another 
panel study in the Netherlands and Denmark involving knowledge of European Union events 
and leaders finds positive eﬀects for public broadcasting in certain  contexts.18 Using cross-
sectional Dutch Election Study data, Aarts and Semetko find strong evidence that not just 
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knowledge but also attitudes and engagement vary according to public versus private media 
consumption.19
While panel studies provide some real strengths in terms of causality, existing work is 
limited in its generalizability. To our knowledge, only three (non-panel) studies have 
addressed the knowledge question with data from more than two countries.20  All are 
suggestive of modest knowledge gaps based on PSB viewership. Holtz-Bacha and Norris find 
significant knowledge eﬀects for public TV preferences in 10 of 14 countries.21 Jenssen et al. 
find positive eﬀects of PBS news exposure and mainly negative eﬀects for commercial news – 
though most eﬀects, but not all, are not significant when controlling for background 
characteristics and political interest. Popescu and Toka also report positive eﬀects across 35 
country cases, but only among those least informed to begin with, and the eﬀect varies 
according to the broadcasting model.22  In each case, results are limited to European 
countries, and to specific knowledge of European political issues and/or party placement on 
ideological scales. Generally, results point to some important diﬀerences between public and 
commercial broadcast news on current aﬀairs knowledge. And the Popsescu and Toka paper 
is one of several recent studies to focus on the influence not just of specific media outlets, 
but media systems on various forms of citizen engagement in public life.23  
In a similar vein, Aalberg and colleagues’ exhaustive 30-year, 6-country study suggests that 
the daily diet of news programming varies according to the (system-level) degree of media 
commercialisation.24  Overall, the supply of prime time news programming is greatest in 
countries where public broadcasters dominate in terms of audience ratings (e.g. Norway and 
Sweden) and lowest in countries where commercial media control the market (e.g United 
States).25  Dual broadcasting models (e.g. United Kingdom) – in which public and private 
channels coexist on relatively equal footing – fall somewhere in between when it comes to 
prime time news availability.
The recurring message, in short, is that simply living in more commercially-oriented (or 
“liberal”) media systems makes an individual less likely to be politically engaged and broadly 
less aware of the events occurring in world around them.26  As Aalberg and Curran report, 
for instance, citizens who are not interested in politics and choose not to pay attention to 
domestic news, still manage to be relatively well informed in European countries with strong 
PSBs. Yet within the US, those with little interest in politics tend to be highly uninformed 
about current aﬀairs.27 Put another way, where private companies dominate the news media 
landscape, citizens tend to be less aware of what and who is making news nationally, and 
also in others parts of the world. Moreover, it appears that knowledge gaps between 
traditionally advantaged and disadvantaged groups in society widen in more commercialised 
media settings.28 What this all suggests is that people who are motivated to get informed are 
able to do so in spite of the media system in their country, but that current aﬀairs 
awareness for those with fewer resources and/or weaker motivation is strongly tied to their 
national media context.
Ultimately, what remains unclear is not so much whether the media system plays a role in 
knowledge transmission (it clearly does), but to what degree PSB matters in each case. The 
fact is that PSBs exist in one form or another in virtually all developed countries, and they 
6
operate in varying contexts of commercialisation. Yet PSBs diﬀer widely in terms of 
audience share, levels and types of public funding, and the institutional independence from 
the political process. This raises the possibility that knowledge eﬀects resulting from 
exposure to commercial or public news are not always consistent. Is exposure to public 
broadcasting related to increases in knowledge of current aﬀairs?  Under what conditions do 
public broadcasters best perform the educative and enlightenment function they all profess 
to fulfil?  We turn now turn to these questions. 
Methodology
The reference country for almost all media system and knowledge research is the United 
States. Widely acknowledged as the prototypical commercial (liberal) media system,29 
however, PSB news plays a marginal role in the news diet for the vast majority of 
Americans.30 We accordingly do not examine the impact of PSB in the US below (given the 
very low number of regular PSB viewers, the US survey did not ask about PSB 
consumption), though we do look at US as well as Australian data to explore briefly the 
impact of television exposure versus newspaper readership on knowledge.  Those results are 
included in the online appendix, and discussed briefly in the concluding section. Here, we 
focus on six countries for which we have comparable survey data, and in which the PSB 
receives a reasonable audience share: Canada, Italy, Japan, Norway, the UK and South 
Korea. Note that these six provide a good amount of variance where media system variables 
are concerned. (We discuss media systems in more detail in the sections that follow.)
Data for all countries was drawn from a unique survey on news exposure and political 
knowledge, fielded (nearly) simultaneously in 2010 across eleven countries.31   Surveys in 
each of the six (plus two) countries used here were conducted online by YouGov Polimetrix. 
Details of these surveys, including survey firms, field dates, and availability, are provided in 
the Appendix. 
As noted above, a central issue in the study of media eﬀects, particularly though not 
exclusively in cross-sectional data, is the problem of self-selection. PSB may well provide a 
greater amount of hard news information than commercial broadcasting. But it is almost 
certainly also true that people interested in news, and with higher levels of hard news 
knowledge to begin with, choose to watch PSB, while those with less interest are less likely 
to do so. We thus cannot easily tell which came first, the chicken (knowledge) or the egg 
(PSB exposure).
The result where statistical analysis is concerned is that the importance of media to political 
knowledge is, as a consequence of endogeneity, fairly easy to overestimate. Indeed, several 
studies, by controlling for self-selection, have rendered ostensibly positive eﬀects for 
newspaper consumption on knowledge spurious because newspapers readers were knowledge, 
motivated, or better educated to begin with.32 Finding an appropriate way to control for the 
cognitive and demographic diﬀerences between media audiences is essential.
One potentially useful approach is propensity score analysis. The approach is designed to 
allow for more reliable causal inferences in observational studies in which randomisation was 
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not possible.33  The crux of the method is as follows: based on a number of background 
characteristics, captured in the “propensity score,” those in a treatment group are “matched” 
to a group of similar others in a non-treatment group. The idea is to approximate 
randomisation in treatment — to produce two relatively similar groups, one exposed to a 
treatment and the other not. The diﬀerence in outcomes between these two groups is then 
the critical test of the impact of treatment.
Comparing means across two groups is of course relatively easy; producing the groups 
themselves is rather more diﬃcult. Doing so relies on a propensity score, capturing 
similarities in individuals across n dimensions. That score is typically produced in a 
regression model of the binary treatment variable. So, in the current case, we first use a 
probit regression model to estimate the likelihood that diﬀerent individuals are exposed to 
public television. The results (predicted likelihoods) from that regression are the propensity 
score. “Like” individuals who were exposed to public television, or not, where likeness is 
determined by their propensity score, are then selected into the treatment and non-
treatment groups.34 And the diﬀerences between the two groups in terms of outcomes (here, 
political knowledge) is the critical test of the impact of treatment (here, public 
broadcasting).
The central diﬃculties in employing matching methods lie in the production of the 
propensity score, and then the matching. In short, the estimation of a propensity score is 
subject to all the same problems as a regular OLS model. Using the correct set of covariates 
to produce propensity scores is critical. As with regular regression models, the exclusion of 
an important covariate opens up the possibility that estimated eﬀects are a consequence not 
of treatment alone, but something else. That is, an inadequate propensity score model leaves 
open the possibility that the matching methods approach does not get around the problem 
of endogeneity.35  To be clear, then: we do not claim here that matching necessarily removes 
the diﬃculties associated with endogeneity in the estimation of media eﬀects. But a 
properly-specified propensity score model can yield somewhat more accurate (and often 
more conservative) estimates of treatment eﬀects.36  In this case, we view propensity score 
matching as a potentially useful way to remove some, though likely not all, of the problems 
associated with self-selection. It is in this way not unlike a similarly-specified regression 
model, though with some additional statistical advantages.37  
We estimate matching below using pscore in STATA.38  There are a number of diﬀerent 
matching algorithms available.39  Here, we rely on radius matching;40 though our results do 
not change fundamentally when other matching algorithms are used.41  The models for 
propensity scores are relatively simple, but also thorough. The “treatments” investigated 
below are as follows: (a) public television viewing, and (b) commercial television viewing. In 
each case, we produce a binary treatment variable that divides the sample roughly in half, 
where one group watches four days or less and the other watches five days or more.
Each of these treatment variables is regressed on a series of demographic and other variables 
likely to aﬀect media exposure. We include the following:
Age: two dummy variables for 35-54 years and 55 and over, with 18-34 years as the 
residual category.42
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Education: an ordinal variable where 1 is primary education, 2 secondary education, 
and 3 tertiary education.
Political Interest: an index based on self-reported interest in national news, 
international news, and local news. In all countries, respondents are asked to rate their 
interest in each on a five-point scale. In each country, the index is used to produce an 
interest scale, recoded here to produce four categories (roughly, quartiles), and then 
split into dummy variables for the second, third and fourth categories, where the first 
tercile is the residual category.
Exposure to Other Media: a continuous index based on self-reported exposure to 
newspapers and radio.
Propensity scores are generated country by country, rather than on a pooled basis, in 
order to allow for the fact that the correlates of media exposure matter diﬀerently in 
each country.43   The magnitude of individual coeﬃcients varies, of course; so too does 
the proportion of variance explained by our model. Pseudo R-squareds for the binary 
probit estimations range from roughly .05 to .25, for instance, with an average of 
about .12. (Complete results are available in the online appendix.)  And to review: the 
idea is to match respondents based on basic demographics, interest in politics, and 
exposure to other media; compare diﬀerences in political knowledge across two groups 
with similar propensities to watch public (or private) television, but where only one of 
those groups has actually been  regularly exposed to public (private) television; and 
then use the estimated diﬀerence in means as the test of the impact of the treatment 
variables.
Political knowledge is measured using an index of between 10 and 16 knowledge questions, 
capturing knowledge of hard and soft news, both national and international. These 
knowledge questions are included in the online appendix; suﬃce it so say here that the 
questions tap a combination of hard and soft news knowledge, both domestic and 
international.   The use of both hard and soft news items is relatively unique; as is the use 
of knowledge questions focused in part on events in the news at the time of the survey. 
International news knowledge questions were common across all surveys; domestic news 
stories obviously varied from country to country, but were designed to be similar in theme 
and diﬃculty. In each country, regardless of the total number of questions, the resulting 
cumulative knowledge index was rescaled to range from 0 to 1, where 1 reflects a correct 
score across all available questions. And in order to account for the possibility that, despite 
our best eﬀorts, the diﬃculty of questions varies somewhat from one country to the other, 
we use knowledge measures below rescaled to standard units (standard deviations from the 
mean, within each country).
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Results
Public or Private Broadcasters: Where Should You Get the News?
Does it matter which television channel you watch news on?  The short answer is yes, but 
the leading public broadcaster is not the consistently better option, at least where learning 
about current aﬀairs is concerned. In some countries PSB is the best option, in others 
countries there is little diﬀerence between public and private networks. 
These points are evident in Figure 1, in which levels of overall, hard, and soft news are 
compared across public and private news exposure treatments. The figure shows knowledge 
eﬀects by country based on consumption of PSB versus commercial news, controlling for 
age, education, and political interest and other media use. The y-axis shows the impact of 
treatments in standard deviations of knowledge. Statistical significance is not shown in this 
figure, but are included in Appendix Table 1, which shows (a) sample sizes for control and 
treatment groups, and (b) the estimated average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATTR), 
based on radius matching, alongside the associated standard error and t- ratio. 
[Figure 1 about here]
In the top panel of Figure 1, it is clear that the type of television channel watched makes a 
diﬀerence for overall current aﬀairs knowledge. In Norway, and to lesser extent in Canada 
and Japan, exposure to news from the public channel has a stronger positive eﬀect on 
overall knowledge than exposure to commercial TV news. Note that in each of those three 
countries exposure to private TV also has a positive impact on knowledge – albeit to a lesser 
degree than public news exposure. That is not the case in the UK. Those who watched BBC 
news scored higher than those who did not, but those who regularly consumed news from 
the leading commercial channel ITV scored lower. Indeed, the UK knowledge gap between 
public and private news exposure is quite striking. 
Perhaps the key point is that in all cases, save for Korea, TV viewing habits – i.e., getting 
news from public versus private newscasts – are strongly correlated with overall knowledge. 
That being said, the direction of eﬀects does not always favour public broadcasters; and the 
impact is still not perfect when we isolate hard news knowledge, in the second panel of 
Figure 1. The story for soft news is similarly not exactly as we might expect. Recall that the 
literature suggests that heavy consumers of commercial media will score higher on our 
questions about celebrity entertainers, athletes, and general human-interest events. This 
expectation holds for Italians, and to lesser degree for Korean and Japanese respondents. 
Yet in Canada and Norway there is little diﬀerence between public and private news for soft 
news knowledge. Most intriguingly, for viewers of the BBC in the UK, public news exposure 
has a considerably larger impact on a person’s ability to correctly answer soft news 
questions than commercial media.
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Private, Semiprivate, and Public News: The United Kingdom 
For the UK only, we can incorporate semiprivate television news exposure, and we do so by 
adding Channel 4 news exposure to a separate country-specific analysis.44  The analysis 
provides a unique opportunity to look at the relationship between market exposure and 
impacts on knowledge. Our expectation is that semiprivate news exposure will fall 
somewhere in between the BBC and ITV. Partial market exposure means there is some 
pressure to generate ad revenues through flashier (and perhaps less informative) content; 
that said, partial immunity from the market may lead to somewhat more substantive 
content as well.  
[Figure 2 about here]
We anticipate that knowledge of current aﬀairs, particularly one’s ability to correctly answer 
questions about foreign aﬀairs or domestic political issues, is bolstered most by regular 
exposure to BBC news, followed by Channel 4 and then ITV news respectively. As depicted 
in Figure 2, this appears to be the case. (As above, detailed results  are provided in 
Appendix Table 1.) For overall knowledge, BBC and to a lesser extent Channel 4 news 
viewing tend to be associated with Britons’ ability to answer the full battery of current 
aﬀairs knowledge questions. As we have already seen, ITV news consumption is negatively 
associated with a person’s ability to correctly answer knowledge questions, all else being 
equal.45  This pattern holds not just for overall and hard news knowledge, but also 
(somewhat unexpectedly) for soft news knowledge as well.
Explaining Variance Among Public Broadcasters 
Forgoing analyses point to similarities but also diﬀerences in the relationship between 
exposure to public broadcasters and citizens’ current aﬀairs knowledge across countries. It is 
not clear why, for instance, broadcasters such as the BBC, NHK (Japan), and NRK 
(Norway) appear to be superior to their private counterparts in this regard, when in other 
countries such as Italy and Korea there is very little to distinguish the public broadcaster 
from other media. We explore here three potential avenues for explaining these diﬀerences.
First, we consider whether diﬀerences in the financial architecture of the various 
broadcasters may be related to knowledge gaps. Results for the UK in Figure 2 already 
point in this direction — that is, they already point towards the possibility that there is a 
relationship between market exposure and informative-ness. So in the top panel of Figure 3 
we plot the total amount of public income derived by each broadcaster as a proportion of 
total revenue (x-axis) against the knowledge gaps in each country produced by exposure to 
public versus private news content (y-axis).46  In other words, the broadcasters’ degree of 
financial “public-ness” against its relative ability to increase knowledge. The logic is that as a 
public broadcaster becomes more exposed to market pressure – i.e. reliant on advertising 
revenue – its programming begins to resemble that of its commercial rivals. 
[Figure 3 about here]
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The top panel of Figure 3 suggests a modest relationship between the financial public-ness of 
the broadcaster and knowledge. Public broadcasters in countries where knowledge gaps are 
widest tend to also have most of their revenue derived from public monies. Countries like 
Canada, and particularly Italy and Korea, where the public broadcasters are most reliant on 
commercial revenue steams are also where knowledge gaps between public and commercial 
TV news are weakest.47
The second panel of Figure 3 examines the relationship between audience share and 
knowledge gaps. Audience share is measured as the percent of total television viewership 
that the main public broadcaster receives, on average.48 Here we are interested in whether 
public broadcasters that attract large daily viewership are also the most educative. One 
logic is that a high daily audience share for the public broadcaster should be indicative of a 
public service-oriented media system. Another is that in countries where the PSB shows the 
most popular entertainment programs (proxied by audience share), there is the greatest 
inadvertent exposure to news. Recent studies have demonstrated that relative to market-
based systems, public service-oriented systems are indeed more likely to cultivate informed 
citizens.49  We thus anticipate that the leading public broadcasters in this type of media 
environment are particularly successful at doing just that. 
Results do suggest that audience share is related with knowledge. Norway and the UK, 
where the public broadcaster attracts high daily ratings, are also where the knowledge gap 
between commercial and public news exposure is widest. Knowledge gaps are somewhat 
lower in Canada and the Japan, but so to is the daily audience share for public broadcasting 
programs. The outlying case is clearly Korea where the leading public broadcaster typically 
draws ratings of about 25 percent of all viewers, yet there is virtually no diﬀerence between 
public and commercial news for current aﬀairs knowledge.
Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 3 explores the possibility that the institutional 
framework of the public broadcaster influences its mandate to inform and enlighten. 
Specifically, we are interested in the degree of institutional independence the public 
broadcaster has from the political process. The logic is that autonomy from everyday 
politics should serve to enhance journalistic objectivity and to generally enable editors and 
journalists alike to pursue and report stories in manner most consistent with the goals of 
public broadcasting. 
To gauge public broadcasting autonomy we rely on a measure of de jure independence (legal 
protection) adopted from the recent work of Hanretty.50  De jure independence (x-axis) is 
scaled from 0-1 and includes 13 indicators ranging from the nature of executive 
appointments and dismissals to requirements for reporting to parliament and governments. 
As illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 3, the relationship between de jure 
independence and knowledge gaps appears to be quite robust. The Italian public broadcaster 
is clearly the least independent of the broadcasters, and its impact on knowledge is less than 
that of the main commercial network.51  Indeed, as noted previously, watching news in 
Italian public television has a net negative impact on knowledge. At the other end of the 
spectrum, public broadcasters in the UK and Norway scored highest on de jure 
independence and were also responsible for the widest knowledge gaps.
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Discussion and Conclusions
What do our results suggest about the relative success of public over commercial 
broadcasters in producing an informed citizenry?  Public broadcasting, in some countries at 
least, clearly matters. Controlling for self-selection as best we can, it appears as though 
those exposed to public television news learn more about hard news (and in some cases soft 
news as well) than those exposed to private television news for the same amount of time per 
week. This eﬀect is markedly greater, however, in countries where the public broadcasters 
are funded mainly if not exclusively by public funds, and where they also have de jure 
independence from government. Essentially, freedom from interference by market forces and 
government seems to lead to a form of public broadcasting that is markedly “better” than its 
commercial rivals.
Might something else fill the void if PSBs disappear from national media landscapes? We 
cannot rule out the possibility that in the absence of a strong public broadcaster, 
commercial stations will produce news more like PSBs. This seems doubtful, however. It is 
costly to generate hard news; and news gathering in foreign countries is particularly resource 
consuming. This is perhaps why one of the main commercial news broadcasts in the US, 
called “World News,” oﬀers less then 2 minutes of international aﬀairs coverage per day.52 
Broadcasting requires good (expensive) journalists to produce current aﬀairs programming, 
and for the most part advertisers are not very interested in hard news.53 There is evidence 
that the quantity of public aﬀairs news supplied by commercial broadcaster is not much 
aﬀected by market conditions;54  and there is also a growing sense that part-time citizen 
journalists, PR specialists, and bloggers simply can't replace full time paid professional 
journalists.55 Editing, fact-checking, job security are important parts of news production. So 
an independent, well-funded public broadcasting may really make a diﬀerence.
Another possibility is that news reading is more educative than news watching. If this were 
true, the absence of a strong public broadcaster might mean little to citizens’ knowledge of 
current aﬀairs; people would either learn (or not) primarily from newspapers and news 
websites, and PSBs would not be missed either way. Our evidence for this proposition is 
scant, however. As presented in the online appendix, newspaper reading is not consistently 
more strongly associated with knowledge (hard or soft) than is television viewing.  In short, 
our analyses do not support the view that newspaper reading has a stronger eﬀect on citizen 
knowledge than viewing news on television. (In Norway and the UK, for instance, television 
viewing has about twice the impact of newspaper consumption on what people know about 
the world.) 
None of this is to say that PSB is a magical elixir for countries with low levels of political 
knowledge. In some countries, including Japan and the US, the public service broadcaster is 
regarded (perhaps justifiably) as bureaucratic and intellectually aloof. Existing work also 
points to real problems with reliance on public broadcasters in post-authoritarian 
countries.56  And work on media systems (rather than individual broadcasters) suggests that 
variation in political knowledge might be seen as a product of the larger media system, 
rather than the product of individual news outlets.
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We have focused here, however, on the potential diﬀerences between public and private 
broadcasters in producing political knowledge, across a range of six developed countries. 
Analyses suggest that the more PSBs come to resemble their commercial counterparts in 
terms dependence on advertising revenue, the less distinguishable their eﬀect on citizens 
becomes. Similarly, and perhaps most importantly, political independence appears a key 
prerequisite for PSBs ability to perform the educative task they are expected to fulfil.57 
Note these patterns are based on trends from a limited number of countries – trends which 
cannot be confirmed statistically, and may not be generalizable given our relatively small 
sample.  That said, this is among the most detailed individual-level cross-national studies of 
the impact of public versus private broadcasters to date.  We are inclined to see the results 
in Figure 3 as, at a minimum, strongly suggestive of a link between the funding and content 
of PSBs. 
Thinking more broadly, this study clearly has implications for evaluating the role of public 
service broadcasting. It is often pointed out that the audience share of public broadcasters is 
declining as a consequence of the growth of channel competition.58  Intensified competitive 
pressure has led, it is suggested, to a weakening of public purpose in some public channels’ 
output.59  This tradition records in eﬀect ‘the decline and fall of public broadcasting’ – the 
title of a well-known book.60 
One response to this decline literature has been to question the speed and extent of decline. 
Thus, it has been argued in relation to some European and English-speaking countries that 
public broadcaster audience share has stabilised or increased where there are two or more 
public broadcasters; that survey evidence indicates a public willingness to pay more for 
public broadcasting (with the exception of Canada); and that some public broadcasters have 
launched successful websites.61  The implication is that public broadcasting is worth 
supporting because it remains popular.
 Another response has been to reformulate the case for public service broadcasting within 
the framework of neo-liberal thought. Public broadcasting, it has been argued, is worth 
preserving because it constitutes a still valid way of compensating for continuing market 
failure (a tendency towards oligopoly) or as a way of reaping positive externalities that 
cannot be realised fully through the market process.62  Public broadcasting, in other words, 
has a legitimate place within a market system.
The implication of this study, in contrast, is that public broadcasting has an important role 
in supporting full citizenship. It suggests that the functioning and performance of public 
broadcasting should be evaluated not only in terms of customer satisfaction, or within the 
horizon of market thought, but in terms of what television can contribute to the functioning 
of democracy. In short, given that public aﬀairs knowledge appears to be significantly 
improved through the publicly-funded provision of news (here, on television, but potentially 
online as well), then governments’ decisions about funding for public broadcasters seem in 
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Appendix Table 1. Proximity Matching Results
Public TV
N All News Hard News Soft News
treat control ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio
CA 302 457 0.221 0.074 2.975 0.067 0.020 3.265 0.106 0.075 1.422
IT 485 419 -0.109 0.070 -1.572 -0.024 0.014 -1.714 -0.060 0.069 -0.867
JP 549 377 0.455 0.070 6.544 0.103 0.017 6.132 0.376 0.074 5.112
NO 575 347 0.471 0.070 6.754 0.123 0.019 6.619 0.295 0.075 3.954
UK 664 233 0.307 0.084 3.643 0.078 0.021 3.670 0.165 0.089 1.857
KR 537 655 0.016 0.059 0.265 0.004 0.012 0.300 0.007 0.059 0.116
Private TV
N All News Hard News Soft News
treat control ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio
CA 401 351 0.072 0.077 0.929 0.020 0.022 0.919 0.049 0.078 0.624
IT 231 644 0.136 0.078 1.754 0.021 0.015 1.378 0.128 0.077 1.661
JP 768 151 0.235 0.111 2.105 0.026 0.026 0.976 0.449 0.113 3.968
NO 566 347 0.122 0.075 1.624 0.005 0.020 0.241 0.281 0.076 3.686
UK 328 549 -0.295 0.070 -4.213 -0.080 0.018 -4.560 -0.105 0.070 -1.506
KR 439 753 0.055 0.062 0.896 0.012 0.012 0.928 0.033 0.061 0.535
Semi-Private TV
N All News Hard News Soft News
treat control ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio
UK 141 726 0.078 0.096 0.813 0.020 0.023 0.868 0.037 0.100 0.372
Propensity scores are based on probit models with age, education, political interest and other media use 
as IVs. Results are estimated using radius matching method.
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Survey Details
Surveys in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, Italy, Japan and Norway were conducted by 
YouGov-PMX. YouGov uses a matching methodology for delivering online samples that 
mirror target populations on key demographics. The approach is described in some detail in 
Shanto Iyengar and Lynn Vavreck, 'Online Panels and the Future of Political 
Communicaiton Research', in Holli A. Semetko and Margaret Scammell, eds, Sage 
Handbook of Political Communicaiton (Beverly Hills: Sage, 2011).
The samples for the US and UK are in this case based directly on existing YouGov panels. 
In  other countries, YouGov applied their sampling techniques to panels maintained by 
Research Now (Canada, Norway, Japan, Australia) and Zapera (Norway).
The Korean survey was conducted by Nielsen KoreanClick, where respondents were drawn 
from a panel of 12,000 Internet users, with matching implement on gender, age and 
education.  
Principle investigators are included as authors for the paper; funding sources are 
acknowledged in the paper as well.
Appendix Tables
Table 1 includes the the full matching models that precede the propensity score analyses in 
the main body of the paper. 
Table 2 includes a sample battery of knowledge questions used to capture hard and soft 
news knowledge.  Questions vary slightly across countries; specific questions are available in 
the country-level survey data files, from the principle investigators listed above.  
Table 3 shows results of a comparison of television versus newspaper exposure on political 
knowledge.  The models are estimated in exactly the same way as for the analyses of public 
versus private broadcasters in the text, with two minor changes: (1) the television viewing 
variable capture television viewing generally rather than public or private viewing, and (2) 
the “other media exposure” variable used in the estimation of propensity scores uses radio 
and newspaper reading in models of television viewing, and radio and television viewing in 
models of newspaper reading. Note that using just general television viewing allows us to 
include both US and Australian data as well.  There is of course much more than can be 
done with these data, but for our purposes (see the Conclusions above) what is most critical 
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is that the estimated impact of newspapers on knowledge is not consistently higher than the 
estimated impact of television viewing.
Tables 4 through 6 include results for the impact of public and private television viewing 
replicated using OLS.  Those results are discussed in some detail below.
Matching vs. OLS Estimates of Media Eﬀects
We have discussed in the main body of the paper the potential advantages of using 
propensity score matching to produce estimates of media eﬀects. There are both advantages 
and disadvantages to that approach, however, and we discuss those in somewhat more detail 
here.  That said, the most critical implication of the findings in Tables 4 through 6 is that 
they are not substantially diﬀerent from those in the text — that is, media eﬀects estimated 
by OLS are very similar to those estimated using matching methods above. Our results are 
robust to changes in estimation.
We have already noted  the issue of endogeneity in the evaluation of media eﬀects.  In the 
present case, PSB may provide a greater amount of hard news information than commercial 
broadcasting, but it is also the case that people interested in, and with higher levels of hard 
news knowledge to begin with, choose to watch PSB. Statistical analyses must try to 
capture which comes first, knowledge or exposure.
There are several diﬀerent possible approaches to this issue.  The more common approach is 
to use a regular (e.g., OLS) regression model, including the other variables related to the 
likelihood of exposure.  By including education and income, for instance, the media exposure 
variable is assumed to capture the impact of exposure above and beyond the impact of 
education and income.  The coeﬃcient is intended to capture the impact of exposure ceteris 
paribus, that is, holding other things equal.
There are serious weaknesses to this approach, however.  First and foremost is the fact that 
the impact of exposure is only exposure per se to the extent that all other possible factors 
driving exposure (self-selection) are included in the model.  Missing any of these factors 
leads to omitted variable bias, and an over-estimate of the coeﬃcient for exposure.  It is 
likely that most if not all existing work relying on standard regression models to estimate 
the impact of media exposure on knowledge makes this error.
Matching methods may provide more realistic estimates - realistic in the sense that they 
may capture the impact of exposure, more independent of the various factors that lead 
respondents to self-select into high- or low-exposure groups. As discussed in the text, 
whether this is the case is a function of the model which produces the propensity score.  If 
that model includes the variables that account for self-selection, then matching methods will 
produce good estimates.  If that model does not include the variables accounting for self-
selection, however, all the problems associated with missing variable bias still apply.  The 
impact of exposure may include the impact of other factors related to self-selection.
That said, the problems resulting from missing variable bias may be somewhat smaller in a 
propensity score analysis.  First, the impact of missing variables, to the extent that they are 
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correlated to variables included in the model of the propensity score, may be subsumed in 
part by the coeﬃcients for those included variables.  The result is an inaccurate (over-
stated) estimate of coeﬃcients in the model of the propensity score; but, as a consequence, 
an estimated propensity score that takes into account, at least in part, these missing 
variables.  The coeﬃcient estimates in the propensity score model are of course of little 
interest — what matters is the estimated treatment eﬀect, which in this case may be 
somewhat more accurate as a consequence of shifting (some of) the impact of missing 
variables into the estimation of the propensity score (rather than leaving it in the estimate 
of treatment eﬀects).
It is still the case that estimating propensity scores likely does not remove the bias produced 
by missing variables; put diﬀerently, matching cannot completely solve the problem of self-
selection in the kinds of models explored above.  Indeed, some work suggests that estimates 
resulting from matching may be no more reliable than those resulting from more traditional 
regressions. (For a particularly useful discussion, see Arceneaux et al. 2006.)  It is, in sum, 
sensible to think of a propensity score analysis not as a method of solving the endogeneity 
problem, but rather as a method that may in the right circumstances reduce bias in the 
estimated treatment eﬀect, in this case, news exposure.
There are some other advantages and disadvantages of matching methods and OLS, but 
those have been discussed in some detail elsewhere (see citations in the text).  Here, the goal 
is mainly to confirm that results shown in the text are not driven by our choice of 
estimation strategy. To do this, we have both re-estimated results using a number of 
diﬀerent matching algorithms, and re-estimated results using simple OLS models.  We show 
the latter here.
OLS models rely on the same variables as the propensity score analysis, though here 
obviously we include all variables in a single model, predicting knowledge as a function of 
television viewing alongside the other controls.  Note that while the matching models 
require that we run separate analyses for our two treatments — public and private television 
viewing — we can include both simultaneously in OLS models; and since doing so does not 
produce coeﬃcients that are vastly diﬀerent from OLS models that examine the two 
treatments separately, we just show just the combined models here.
There are some minor diﬀerences between the matching and OLS results, to be sure.  OLS 
reveals no significant impact of television viewing on knowledge in Canada; and the ratio of 
the impact of public versus private television varies somewhat in certain countries from the 
matching to the OLS results.  But these are relatively minor diﬀerences; and the general 
findings hold.  That is, it is still the case that (a) in most countries, public television 
viewing has a significant positive impact on knowledge, while private television viewing does 
not, (b) this is particularly true for hard news knowledge, while for soft news knowledge 
private television viewing, particularly in Japan and Norway, (c) by far the largest gap in 
impact between public and and private broadcasters is in the UK, followed by, depending on 
whether it is combined, hard, or soft news knowledge, some combination of Norway and 
Japan.
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In sum, these results make clear that analyses in the text are not a peculiar product of 
propensity score matching.  That said, they do make clear that the advantages of propensity 
score matching may be rather limited where eliminating endogeneity is concerned.  The 
magnitude of the eﬀect as estimated using OLS is not consistently lower than the eﬀect 
estimated using matching, for instance.  (This is true in some but not all cases.) 
Endogeneity remains a concern, clearly, and panel data (in which respondents actually 
change their sources of news) may be the only way to solve that problem definitively.  In 
the meantime, we suggest that our results come as close as they can with cross-sectional 
data; and while the overall impact of television news may be slightly over-stated overall, the 
diﬀerences between public and private television are both robust to changes in specification, 
and meaningful.
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Online Appendix Table 1. Propensity Score Models, Public, Private and Semi-Private Television 
Viewing
DV: Public TV Viewing Semi(private)
 CA IT JP NO UK KR UK
Age: 35(54 .076 .121 .315** .526** .350** .351** .061
 (.130) (.127) (.152) (.121) (.112) (.089) (.127)
Age: 55+ .173 .450** .882** 1.225** .662** .819** .038
 (.129) (.136) (.167) (.156) (.138) (.132) (.150)
Education .026 .055 .333** .102 .114 .033 .057
 (.091) (.076) (.131) (.088) (.082) (.049) (.101)
Interest, cat1 -1.182** .038 .707** .486** .523** .352** .212
 (.182) (.151) (.231) (.223) (.177) (.163) (.187)
Interest, cat2 -1.049** .227* -.290 .587** .393** (.169 .491** 
 (.149) (.126) (.214) (.171) (.164) (.138) (.167)
Interest, cat3 -.616** .318** -.024 .063 .104 .125 .138
 (.137) (.121) (.214) (.166) (.167) (.139) (.154)
Media Use .300** .265** .223** .350** .298** .286** .358** 
 (.067) (.054) (.076) (.072) (.067) (.055) (.070)
Constant -.241 (.941** -1.026** -.963** .360 -.633** -1.540** 
 (.279) (.246) (.445) (.319) (.276) (.192) (.314)
N 759 904 926 922 867 1192 878
DV: Private TV Viewing
CA IT JP NO UK KR
Age: 35(54 .322** .065 .355** .388** .247** .386** 
 (.123) (.140) (.167) (.117) (.110) (.092)
Age: 55+ .693** .026 .701** .723** .242* .601** 
 (.124) (.151) (.171) (.147) (.126 (.132)
Education .046 .070 .042 .081 .420** .055
 (.094) (.085) (.134) (.089) (.079 (.050
Interest, cat1 .758** .300* .257 .242 .122 .370** 
 (.175) (.169) (.280) (.210) (.165) (.164
Interest, cat2 .658** .180 .100 .245 .133 .344** 
 (.150) (.135) (.263) (.157) (.147) (.140)
Interest, cat3 .324** .208 .161 .239 .016 .191
 (.142) (.127) (.255) (.157) (.145) (.139)
Media Use .312** .359** .248** .115** .243** .263** 
 (.067) (.060) (.085) (.020) (.062) (.056)
_cons .285 1.386** .348 .913** .054 .942** 
 (.283) (.271) (.515) (.319) (.262) (.194)
N 752 875 919 913 877 1192
* p < .10; ** p < .05. Cells contain probit regression coeﬃcients with standard errors in parentheses.
Online Appendix Table 2. Knowledge Questions: Cross-National and UK Domestic
As noted in the text, hard and soft news knowledge is based on a battery of knowledge 
questions asked in each country. Some questions were the same from country to country; 
others were country-specific (the goal being to capture a combination of national and 
international aﬀairs knowledge). We list below the knowledge questions asked in the 
Canadian survey, indicating whether they were common to all surveys or specific to the 
Canada. Other country-specific questions are available in the the datafiles and codebooks for 
each country; these are available from the Principle Investigators for each survey.
Hard News
Common
Angela Merkel holds what position?
•Chancellor of Germany 
•US Attorney General 
•European Union chairman 
•Austrian Prime Minister  
•Can't say
Vladimir Putin serves as: 
•Prime Minister of Russia 
•Coach of the Edmonton Oilers 
•Owner of the Yokos Oil Company 
•Russia’s UN ambassador 
•Can't say
In Thailand the 'red shirts' are: 
•Demonstrators sympathetic to ousted prime 
minister, Thaksin Shinawatra 
•Buddhist social movement  
•Pro-communist demonstrators  
•A section of the armed forces violently suppressing 
dissent 
•Can’t say
Angela Merkel holds what position?
•Chancellor of Germany 
•US Attorney General 
•European Union chairman 
•Austrian Prime Minister  
•Can't say
The Copenhagen Summit refers to a: 
•Conference on climate change 
•Meeting of EU Heads of State 
•Free Trade Treaty 
•Agreement to increase foreign aid for developing 
nations 
•Can’t say
The term Taliban refers to: 
•The Rulers of Afghanistan 1996-2001 
•An Iranian political party 
•A Province in the disputed Kashmir region 
•Supporters of the former dictator of Iraq 
•Can't say 














The Speaker of the House of Commons recently 













Former Conservative MP Rahim Jaﬀer is involved in 
a parliamentary investigation about what?
•Lobbying activities and parliamentary ethics
•Using undisclosed personal finances to pay for his 
campaign











American golfer Tiger Woods recently took a break 
from the professional tour. Why did he stop taking 
part in tournaments? 
•He was undergoing marital counseling 
•Other commercial interests took precedence over 
golf 
•He was recovering from back surgery 


















Online Appendix Table 3. The Eﬀect of  Television versus Newspapers
TV
N All News Hard News Soft News
treat control ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio
AS 711 228 0.276 0.083 3.331 0.057 0.019 2.981 0.276 0.088 3.136
CA 469 299 0.157 0.084 1.876 0.034 0.024 1.440 0.173 0.086 2.017
IT 778 140 0.307 0.120 2.568 0.028 0.024 1.167 0.426 0.120 3.554
JP 771 155 0.298 0.114 2.625 0.049 0.027 1.803 0.420 0.117 3.593
NO 606 323 0.464 0.074 6.243 0.114 0.020 5.807 0.347 0.079 4.400
UK 662 240 0.300 0.085 3.517 0.061 0.022 2.843 0.311 0.089 3.488
US 606 312 0.084 0.082 1.030 -0.003 0.020 -0.133 0.219 0.082 2.673
KR 707 485 0.387 0.061 6.354 0.070 0.012 5.794 0.326 0.063 5.174
Newspapers
N All News Hard News Soft News
treat control ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio ATTR se t-ratio
AS 426 513 0.172 0.068 2.537 0.037 0.016 2.355 0.145 0.068 2.141
CA 385 383 0.205 0.078 2.616 0.056 0.022 2.556 0.143 0.080 1.796
IT 551 367 0.176 0.074 2.369 0.029 0.015 2.014 0.153 0.075 2.036
JP 579 347 0.216 0.077 2.817 0.038 0.019 2.014 0.283 0.077 3.651
NO 727 202 0.252 0.093 2.709 0.050 0.024 2.146 0.273 0.103 2.660
UK 451 451 0.160 0.069 2.325 0.030 0.017 1.772 0.186 0.069 2.680
US 413 505 0.169 0.068 2.475 0.028 0.017 1.694 0.185 0.069 2.677
KR 567 625 0.472 0.058 8.118 0.094 0.012 8.100 0.320 0.059 5.391
Propensity scores are based on probit models with age, education, political interest and other media use as 
IVs. Results are estimated using radius matching method.
Online Appendix Table 4. All Knowledge, OLS estimates
DV: All Knowledge
 CA IT JP NO UK KR
Public -.092 -.165* .339** .213** .375** -.086 
 (.076) (.066) (.076) (.078) (.077) (.061) 
Private -.007 .045 .137 -.028 -.383** -.038 
(.075) (.074) (.098) (.074) (.066) (.063) 
Age: 35-54 .359** .099 .056 .158* .384** .256** 
(.080) (.096) (.096) (.079) (.078) (.066) 
Age: 55+ .784** .227* .160 .470** .422** .196 
 (.081) (.103) (.099) (.093) (.084) (.100) 
Education .390** .307** .465** .308** .169** .027 
 (.060) (.059) (.069) (.058) (.054) (.034) 
Interest, cat1 -.915** -.639** -.832** -.848** -.849** -.631** 
 (.116) (.116) (.128) (.131) (.114) (.126) 
Interest, cat2 -.607** -.327** -.490** -.511** -.513** -.355** 
 (.103) (.096) (.118) (.098) (.097) (.115) 
Interest, cat3 -.183 -.145 -.296** -.087 -.223* -.079 
 (.096) (.087) (.112) (.087) (.091) (.115) 
Media Use .097* .212** .174** .279** .263** .346** 
 (.044) (.042) (.046) (.050) (.040) (.039) 
Constant -.929** -.844** -1.367** -1.432** -.865** -.487** 
 (.197) (.195) (.248) (.199) (.187) (.151) 
N 752 875 919 913 877 1192
Rsq .278 .137 .330 .329 .276 .155 
* p < .05; ** p < .01. Cells contain OLS regression coeﬃcients with 
standard errors in parentheses
Online Appendix Table 5. Hard News Knowledge, OLS estimates
DV: Hard Knowledge
 CA IT JP NO UK KR
Public -.018 -.034* .075** .070** .097** -.018 
 (.022) (.013) (.017) (.021) (.019) (.012) 
Private -.005 .005 .008 -.041* -.102** -.008 
(.021) (.015) (.020) (.020) (.016) (.013) 
Age: 35-54 .097** .042* .027 .044* .102** .053** 
(.022) (.019) (.020) (.020) (.019) (.013) 
Age: 55+ .185** .075** .060** .138** .123** .049* 
 (.022) (.021) (.023) (.024) (.021) (.020) 
Education .105** .062** .108** .096** .060** .003 
 (.017) (.012) (.015) (.015) (.013) (.007) 
Interest, cat1 -.259** -.102** -.216** -.244** -.199** -.132** 
 (.033) (.023) (.029) (.033) (.028) (.025) 
Interest, cat2 -.182** -.059** -.126** -.153** -.119** -.087** 
 (.029) (.019) (.028) (.026) (.024) (.023) 
Interest, cat3 -.047 -.024 -.077** -.038 -.050* -.035 
 (.027) (.018) (.027) (.024) (.023) (.023) 
Media Use .025* .034** .035** .056** .061** .067** 
 (.012) (.008) (.011) (.012) (.010) (.008) 
Constant -.235** -.182** -.286** -.355** -.263** -.076* 
 (.055) (.038) (.053) (.051) (.047) (.030) 
N 752 875 919 913 877 1192
Rsq .261 .117 .316 .334 .283 .148 
* p < .05; ** p < .01. Cells contain OLS regression coeﬃcients with 
standard errors in parentheses
Online Appendix Table 6. Soft News Knowledge, OLS estimates
DV: Soft Knowledge
 CA IT JP NO UK KR
Public -.111 -.104 .302** .022 .183* -.055 
 (.081) (.067) (.105) (.085) (.087) (.064) 
Private .015 .056 .326* .237** -.154* -.025 
(.078) (.075) (.143) (.079) (.071) (.065) 
Age: 35-54 .252** -.079 -.081 .078 .160 .157* 
(.091) (.095) (.137) (.095) (.089) (.070) 
Age: 55+ .743** -.046 -.084 .177 .061 .040 
 (.090) (.103) (.136) (.106) (.095) (.097) 
Education .278** .193** .365** .075 -.084 .040 
 (.065) (.061) (.104) (.061) (.058) (.036) 
Interest, cat1 -.563** -.584** -.444* -.360* -.615** -.374** 
 (.123) (.116) (.188) (.164) (.126) (.124) 
Interest, cat2 -.304** -.254** -.268 -.167 -.384** -.090 
 (.104) (.096) (.164) (.099) (.107) (.105) 
Interest, cat3 -.142 -.125 -.152 .063 -.184 .122 
 (.097) (.088) (.155) (.085) (.098) (.103) 
Media Use .074 .192** .185** .301** .195** .254** 
 (.047) (.043) (.060) (.054) (.046) (.038) 
Constant -.772** -.460* -1.356** -1.042** -.020 -.524** 
 (.199) (.200) (.393) (.215) (.203) (.146) 
N 752 875 919 913 877 1192
Rsq .161 .091 .190 .158 .101 .085 
* p < .05; ** p < .01. Cells contain OLS regression coeﬃcients with 
standard errors in parentheses.
